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NOTES
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES RECOVERY UNDER
THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
Liquidated damage recovery has long been a source of confusion
for courts and private parties alike.' Throtgh the years a constant ten-
sion has divided the competing policies of encouraging parties' freedom
to contract and analyzing the equities involved in each case. While in
earlier years courts struck down all liquidated damage clauses as penal-
ties, in this century courts began encouraging parties to fix their damage
exposure in advance.2 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts marks
another step in changing liquidated damage clause analysis.3 Following
the Uniform Commercial Code's approach to liquidated damages,4 the
Restatement Second allows a party to assert as a defense the absence of any
actual damages which, if successful, will void an otherwise valid liqui-
dated damage clause. Codified standards for a defense of no actual
damages are long overdue. The Restatement Second may reduce the wide-
spread confusion in this area.
I
HISTORY
A. Case Law Prior to the First Restatement of Contracts
Historically, courts have had difficulty distinguishing penalties
from valid liquidated damage clauses. In early English legal history,
parties used penal bonds to secure performance of a contract. 5 Upon a
breach, the entire amount of the bond was due immediately, regardless
of the actual damage suffered. 6 Courts sitting in equity, however, had
jurisdiction to intervene and mitigate the harsh results where the breach
1 In Giesecke v. Cullerton, 280 Ill. 510, 513, 117 N.E. 777, 778 (1917), the court
observed:
[No branch of the law is involved in more obscurity by contradictory deci-
sions than whether a sum specified in an agreement to secure performance
will be treated as liquidated damage or a penalty, and that each case must
depend upon its own peculiar and attendant circumstances, and that there-
fore general rules of law on this subject are very often of very little practical
significance.
2 See RESTATEMENT OF CoTRACrs § 339(1) (1932); notes 41-49 and accompanying
text inf.a
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1979); see notes 86-102 and ac-
companying text infya.
4 U.C.C. § 2-718(1).
5 3 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 774 (1920).
6 Id See a/so Fletcher v. Dyche, 100 Eng. Rep. 18, 21 (1787) (agreement to pay stipu-
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did not cause any actual damage. 7 Eventually, legislatures in both Eng-
land and the United States curtailed the use of penal bonds.8
American courts recognized the parties' right to set damages in ad-
vance of a breach, and distinguished valid clauses from penalties.9
These courts allowed recovery where the parties had attempted to rea-
sonably estimate in advance the damages that might result from a
breach.10 In contrast, where the preset damages were "disproportionate
to the damage which could have been anticipated from breach of the
contract, and which [were] agreed upon in order to enforce performance
S. .,,1 the courts labeled the clause an "unenforceable penalty."' 2
B. The Conflicting Policies on the Role of Actual Damages
1. Freedom of Contract
Judicial encouragement of freedom of contract has been important
throughout American legal history.13 In the area of liquidated damages,
this encouragement translated into enforcement of liquidated damage
clauses if the parties, at the time of contracting, reasonably tried to esti-
mate possible harm from a breach.1 4 Courts and commentators posited
lated sum each week that work is unfinished valid regardless of work's nearness to
completion).
7 3 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 774-775 (1920). See also Kemble v. Farren, 130 Eng.
Rep. 1234 (1829) (liquidated damages clause void unless clause specifies stipulations in agree-
ment to which liquidated damages apply).
8 3 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 774 (1920).
9 See Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v. Moore, 183 U.S. 642, 660-61 (1901) (detailing
history of penal bonds in England to disprove argument that courts may void sum dispropor-
tionate to actual loss); Bignall v. Gould, 119 U.S. 495, 498 (1886) ("Whoever framed this
agreement does not appear to have had any very clear idea of the distinction between a
penalty and liquidated damages. . . .'); Chicago House-Wrecking Co. v. United States, 106
F. 385, 389 (1901) ("The parties cannot, by calling the sum mentioned 'stipulated damges,'
change what is essentially a penalty."); 3 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 778 (1920) ("[W]hen
contracts are drawn by lawyers the sum stipulated for is usually called liquidated damages,
but courts rightly pay little attention to the name given to a sum payable in terms on a
breach of contract.').
10 See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907); Frick v. Rubel
Corp., 62 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1933); Ellicott Mach. Co. v. United States, 43 Ct. Cl. 232 (1908).
Early courts were concerned with ensuring that the breach, which would trigger a liquidated
damages clause, was narrowly defined in the contract so that a minor breach would not result
in the full liquidated damages recovery. See Bignall v. Gould, 119 U.S. 495 (1886); Kemble v.
Farren, 130 Eng. Rep. 1234 (1829).
11 See Bignall v. Gould, 119 U.S. 495 (1886) ("liquidated damages" clause held to be
penalty).
12 Chicago House-Wrecking Co. v. United States, 106 F. 385 (1901) ("stipulated dam-
ages" held to be penalty); Caesar v. Rubinson, 147 N.Y. 492, 67 N.E. 58 (1903) ("liquidated
damages" clause in lease held to be penalty).
13 The freedom of contract theory was developed in a line of Supreme Court cases.
14 Wise v. United States, 249 U.S. 361, 365 (1919) (intention of parties when contract
made); Sun Printing & Publishing v. Moore, 183 U.S. 642, 662 (1902) ("[T]his court has
consistently maintained the principle that the intention of the parties is to be arrived at by a
proper construction of the agreement made between them. .. 2).
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that an unexpected turn of events resulting in no actual damage was
simply a risk of doing business. 15 Nonenforcement of a valid liquidated
damage clause for lack of actual damage was therefore an infringement
on the parties' freedom of contract. 16 These courts limited their func-
tion to weeding out cases of fraud or coercion in the original contact. 17
The courts' emphasis on the parties' freedom of contract often resulted
in upholding liquidated damage clauses where little or no damage actu-
ally occurred.' 8
Many courts relied on Supreme Court cases that had upheld liqui-
dated damage clauses in the absence of actual damage on freedom of
contract grounds. 19 The landmark case is United States a Bethlehem Steel
Co. 20 In Bethlehem Steel, Bethlehem Steel had contracted to sell gun car-
riages to the government for use in the Spanish-American War. Because
time was of the essence for the government, the parties inserted a fairly-
bargained 2' liquidated damage clause of thirty-five dollars per gun car-
riage for each day's delay.2 2 Although the war ended before perform-
ance on the contract became due, the government still sought to enforce
the liquidated damage clause when Bethlehem Steel failed to deliver the
guns on time.23
The Supreme Court examined the parties' intent at the time of con-
tracting and determined that the clause was a fair estimate of the harm
that might have resulted from the- failure to deliver in a timely man-
15 C. McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 150 (1935). See also McCarthy v. Tally, 46 Cal. 2d 577,
297 P.2d 981 (1956).
16 See Stephens v. Essex Co. Park Comm'n, 143 F. 844 (3d Cir. 1906); Byron Jackson Co.
v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Cal. 1940); Parker-Washington Co. v. City of Chicago,
267 Ill. 136, 107 N.E. 872 (1915).
17 See, e.g., Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v. Moore, 183 U.S. 642, 669-70 (1902) ("If
they are competent to contract within the prudential rules the law has fixed as to parties, and
there has been no fraud, circumvention or illegality in the case, the court is bound to enforce
the agreement.").
18 See, e.g., Ellicott Mach. Co. v. United States, 43 Ct. Cl. 232 (1908); Byron Jackson Co.
v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 665, 667 (S.D. Cal. 1940) (Although the government admitted
total absence of damages, "recovery of liquidated damages is allowed upon mere proof of an
explicit contractual undertaking to that effect. No proof that, in fact, damage did not flow
from the breach is allowed.").
19 Rex Trailer v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); Wise v. United States, 249 U.S. 361
(1919); United States v. Bethlehem Steel, 205 U.S. 105 (1907); Sun Printing & Publishing
Ass'n v. Moore, 183 U.S. 642 (1901).
20 205 U.S. 105 (1907).
21 Id at 106-14. The parties agreed to set the liquidated damages clause amount equal
to the average difference between the contract price and the price that Bethlehem Steel had
submitted as a bid when it contemplated later delivery. The parties corrected an error in the
computation of the damage amount prior to signing the contract. From the correspondence
between the two parties, id, it appears that Bethlehem Steel was fully aware of the terms of
the provision.
22 Id at 118.
23 Id
[Vol. 67:862
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ner.24 Accordingly, the Court held that the clause was valid and en-
forceable despite the lack of actual damage.25 In so holding, the Court
stressed the importance of freedom to contract. 26
The holding in Bethlehem Steel is justified more by the unique char-
acteristics of government contracts than by the policy of enforcing the
parties' freedom to contract. Arguably, government contracts during
wartime require greater certainty than an ordinary commercial con-
tract.27 Peacetime government contracts also pose unique problems of
quantifying the actual damage of delay in completing a public work.28
Subsequent reliance on Bethlehem Steel and later Supreme Court cases
24 Id at 119, 121.
25 Id at L19. The Supreme Court focused only on what the party had intended at the
time of contracting. The Court stated: "When such intention is ascertained, it is ordinarily
the duty of the court to carry it out." Id
26 The Court explained:
courts have now become strongly inclined to allow parties to make their own
contracts, and to carry out their intentions, even when it would result in the
recovery of an amount stated as liquidated damages, upon proof of the viola-
tion of the contract, and without proof of the damages actually sustained.
Id
27 As Justice Frankfurter suggested in his strongly-worded dissent in Priebe & Sons, Inc.
v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 417 (1947), wartime government contracts have different sali-
ent features and should be governed by different policy considerations than ordinary com-
mercial contracts. Id at 419-21. Piebe involved a government contract for the delivery of
dried eggs and provided for liquidated damages in case of failure to obtain inspection certifi-
cates by a specified date. Although Priebe & Sons failed to obtain the certificates on time, the
delivery schedule was not impaired. The majority held that the clause was void as a penalty
because the government could not have foreseen a monetary loss resulting from delay of the
intervening steps necessary for delivery. Id at 413. Justice Frankfurter acknowledged that
the reasoning of the majority would apply in the context of an ordinary commercial contract,
but concluded that the wartime government contract setting justified a contrary result. Id at
419-21.
Strong reasons support treating wartime government contract cases differently from ordi-
nary commercial transactions. First, as Justice Frankfurter points out in rebe, the need for
certainty in a wartime government procurement contract is stronger than in ordinary con-
tracts. Id at 419. The success of a war effort may depend on timely fulfillment of these
contracts. Second, because the provisions of government contracts are standardized through
legislative guidelines, both sides have knowledge of the terms, and the element of unfair sur-
prise that may characterize private contracts is missing. In federal construction contracts, for
example, a per diem damages clause for delay is standard practice. These amounts are speci-
fied by law in the bid documents that all prospective contractors receive. See Federal Pro-
curement Regulations, 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.315-3(b), 1-8.700 (1981); Gantt & Breslauer, infra note
29, at 74; Peckar, Liquidated Damages in Federal Consittion Contracts: Timefor a New Approach, 5
PUB. CoNT. LJ. 129, 130-31 (1972). Third, determining the amount of damages that might
flow from a government contract, particularly one involving national defense, is extremely
difficult. Damages for failure to supply clothing, equipment, planes, or food during wartime
cannot be objectively measured. See United States v. Walkof, 144 F.2d 75, 77 (2d Cir. 1944)
(liquidated damages clause for delay in providing overalls to War Department upheld, de-
spite availability of comparable items, because late delivery might have caused difficulties in
the war effort).
28 See. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. City of Chicago, 234 F. Supp. 726, 729 (N.D. Ill. 1964)
(difficulty of quantifying actual damages where superhighway delayed), afd, 350 F.2d 649
(7th Cir. 1965); Peckar, supra note 27, at 130.
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involving government contracts29 was therefore misplaced when applied
indiscriminately to liquidated damage clauses.
An evidentiary rule arose as a corollary to the freedom of contract
analysis. Because the plaintiff need not plead or prove actual damage in
order to recover, the defendant could not introduce evidence of the ab-
sence of damage. 30 This evidentiary rule expedited resolution of certain
cases. Parties commonly use liquidated damages clauses when damages
will be either uncertain in amount or unascertainable. Enforcement of
these clauses when damage obviously existed thus greatly reduced the
time and expense of litigation. In cases of little or no actual damage,
however, the court had no evidence from which to judge the extent of
damage. The latter setting and its potential for injustice led certain
courts away from strict enforcement of the parties' freedom of contract
in ordinary commercial cases.31
2. The Equitable Rule
Where the actual damage resulting from a breach was small or
nonexistent, some courts used equitable principles to avoid enforcing a
liquidated damage clause.32 When the parties had made a reasonable
estimate of the possible harm from a breach, yet through some unfore-
seen contingency there were no damage, "the expressed intent of the
parties [was] made to give way to the equity of the particular case
. . .., In this manner, selective judicial enforcement of otherwise
valid liquidated damage clauses prevented unjustly enriching the bene-
29 For examples of government contracts resulting in little or no actual damage that
were upheld on the authority of Bethlehem Steel, see Southwest Eng'r Co. v. United States, 341
F.2d 998 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 819 (1965); United States v. LeRoy Dyal Co., 186
F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951)); In re Lion Overall Co., 55 F. Supp.
789 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), af'd sub nom. United States v. Walkof, 144 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1944). See
also Gantt & Breslauer, Liquidated Damages in Federal Govemment Contracts, 47 B.U. L. REv. 71
(1967).
30 See Stephens v. Essex Co. Park Comm'n, 143 F. 844 (3d Cir. 1906); Byron Jackson Co.
v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Cal. 1940); Parker-Washington Co. v. City of Chicago,
267 Ill. 136, 107 N.E. 872 (1915). But see 5 S. CORBIN, CONTRAars § 1062 (1935) (supporting
view that defendants should be allowed to introduce evidence on lack of damages).
31 See note 33 and accompanying text infira
32 See Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947) (liquidated damages
clause for delays in obtaining inspection certificates void as penalty; goods were ultimately
delivered promptly); Massman Constr. Co. v. City Council of Greenville, 147 F.2d 925 (5th
Cir. 1945) (liquidated damages clause for delays in construction of bridge void as penalty
despite delay in construction; bridge finished 30 days before road leading to it); The Colom-
bia, 197 F. 661 (S.D. Ala. 1912) (liquidated damages clause for delay in repairs of ship not
enforced; no evidence ship could have been on water earning profit during delay period); Gay
Mfg. Co. v. Camp., 65 F. 794 (4th Cir. 1895) (liquidated damages clause for 15-day delay in
rent payments not enforced; entire 2-year lease paid after suit instituted).
33 Seeman v. Biemann, 108 Wis. 365, 373, 84 N.W. 490, 492 (1900). The circuit court in
Harris v. Miller, 11 F. 118, 121 (C.C.D. Or. 1880), stated that "[u]pon this subject the law is
peculiar, and, instead of giving effect to the contract of the parties according to their inten-
tions, it assumes to control them according to its standard of justice."
[Vol. 67:862
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ficiaries of the clause.34 Because some courts did not adopt this policy
and strictly followed the government-contract cases holding freedom of
contract paramount,3 5 the results of cases where subsequent events re-
vealed no actual damage were extremely unpredictable.3 6
II
THE FIRST RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
The first Restatement of Contracts 37 favored the common-law pol-
icy of freedom of contract rather than an individual analysis of the ac-
tual harm in each case. The first Restatement thus followed the common
law's focus on the parties' intent at the time of contracting.38 Few courts
under the Restatement considered the equitable position of the parties in
order to invalidate the damage clause where no actual damage resulted
34 [Cjonceding the rule to be that, in order to recover a sum as liquidated dam-
ages, it is unnecessary to prove actual damage, it is also true that no provision
in a contract for the payment of a fixed sum as damages, will be enforced in a
case where the court can see that no damages have been sustained.
NorthWest Fixture Co. v. Kilbourne & Clark Co., 128 F. 256, 261 (9th Cir. 1904); see Seeman
v. Biemann, 108 Wis. 365, 373-74, 84 N.W. 490, 492 (1900) ("While courts adhere to the
doctrine that the intention of the parties must govern.. . , they uniformly take such liberties
in regard to the matter. . . , as may be necessary to effect judicial notions of equity...
where otherwise an unconscionable advantage would be obtained by one person over
another.").
35 See notes 13-31 and accompanying text supra.
36 Occasionally the courts' insistence on actual damage caught the parties by surprise,
and the results of cases were not always dictated by fairness. In McCann v. City of Albany,
158 N.Y. 634,53 N.E. 673 (1899), the defendant city was apparently unaware that it might be
required to show actual damages in a case where the plaintiff contractor clearly had delayed
completion of a sewer. The New York Appellate Division affirmed the decision of a special
referee that the liquidated damages clause should not be enforced, but did so on the ground
that the city suffered only nominal damage. The city appealed, claiming that the issue of
damages was never brought up in trial, and that, if given a chance, it could show actual
damages. The New York Court of Appeals, although agreeing that the issue had never come
up in trial, held that the city "elected to defend the action as to this item upon the theory that
it was entitled to the entire sum. . . , without reference to the actual damages sustained by
it. . . ." 158 N.Y. at 640, 53 N.E. at 674. Given the prevalence of the view that parties'
freedom of contract should be upheld, the city's failure to allege or prove actual damage is
understandable.
37 Section 339(1) provided:
An agreement, made in advance of breach, fixing the damages therefor, is not
enforceable as a contract and does not affect the damages recoverable for the
breach, unless
(a) the amount fixed is a reasonable forecast ofjust compensation for the harm
that is caused by the breach, and (b) the harm that is caused by the breach is
one that is incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation.
38 See United States v. J.D. Streett & Co., 151 F. Supp. 469, 472 (E.D. Mo. 1957) (liqui-
dated damages provisions must be judged as of the time of contracting); Byron Jackson Co. v.
United States, 35 F. Supp. 665; 667 (S.D. Cal. 1940) (federal law only allows consideration of
evidence of inient at time of contracting); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 35 F. Supp. 959 (E.D. Pa. 1940) (bond in case of breach valid because valid at time of
contract).
1982]
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from the breach.39
Section 339 of the first Restatement contained a two-part test for de-
termining the validity of a liquidated damage clause. First, section
339(1) (a), the "intent of the parties" test, 4° required the amount of dam-
ages to be "a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm that
is caused by the breach."'4 ' Commentators criticized the "intent" test as
circular;42 if the court wanted to enforce the clause, the parties "in-
tended" a liquidated damage clause, and if the court wanted to invali-
date the clause, the parties "intended" a penalty.43 Most courts,
however, followed the literal language of the first Restatement, and evalu-
ated the parties' intent at the time of contracting.44
The second part of the Restatement's test provided that the harm
caused by the breach must be "incapable or very difficult of accurate
estimation." 45 This language caused confusion by failing to indicate the
time frame courts should use in determining whether the damages were
difficult to ascertain. Arguably, courts could have used the time of the
trial as the proper point for assessing the difficulty of ascertaining dam-
ages, and thereby allowed a defense of no actual damages.46 The Illus-
39 See notes 60-62 infra
40 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 778 (1961). Labelling the first Restatement test an "in-
tent test" was something of a misnomer, for the actual intent of the parties was often largely
irrelevant. The crucial consideration in this analysis, rather, was the reasonableness of the
parties' efforts to forecast the damage from a breach. The courts' tendency to downplay the
parties' intent can be seen in those cases where they enforced a pre-estimated damages clause,
even though called a "penalty" in the contract. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Co., 205 U.S. 105, 115 (1907) ("penalty" for delay in delivery of gun carriages upheld); Mass-
man Constr. Co. v. City Council of Greenville, 147 F.2d 925, 928 (5th Cir. 1945) ("liquidated
damages clause" for delay in completion of bridge void as penalty); Blewett v. Front St. Cable
Ry., 51 F. 625, 627-28 (9th Cir. 1892) (bond-fixing "penalty" in case of breach upheld); Bauer
v. Sawyer, 8 Ill. 2d 351, 134 N.E.2d 329 (1956) (liquidated damages clause in partnership
agreement restricting area in which withdrawn partner could practice void as penalty).
41 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339(1)(a) (1932); see 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 777 (1961).
42 See Dunbar, Drafting the Liquidated Damage Clause-When and How, 20 OHIO ST. LJ.
221 (1959).
43 Note, UCC 2-718(1): Attomqys Fees as Liquidated Damages in New York, 51 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 100, 106 (1976).
44 See United States v. J.D. Streett & Co., 151 F. Supp. 469, 472 (E.D. Mo. 1957) (liqui-
dated damages provisions must be judged as of time of contracting); United States v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 35 F. Supp. 959 (E.D. Pa. 1940) (bond in case of breach valid
because valid at time of contract); Byron Jackson Co. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 665, 667
(S.D. Cal. 1940) (federal law only allows consideration of evidence of intent at time of
contracting).
45 Section 339(1)(b) provides: "[T]he harm that is caused by the breach is one that is
incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation."
46 Illustration 2 to § 339, for example, presents a situation in which "[t]he harm caused
to A ...is incapable of computation with reasonable accuracy even after the breach had
occurred." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339, Illustration 2 (1932). For examples of
courts using the time of contracting as the vantage point for evaluating parties' intent, see
Robbins v. Plant, 174 Ark. 639, 297 S.W. 1027 (1927); Better Foods Mkts., Inc. v. American
Dist. Tel. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 179, 184-85, 253 P.2d 10, 14 (1953); Bauer v. Sawyer, 8 Ill. 2d 351,
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trations to section 339, however, indicated a contrary result by
disallowing this defense in fact patterns in which it would have been
applicable. 47
The drafters of the first Restatement included additional material
that also suggested a no actual damage defense. Comment e stated that
if "the parties honestly but mistakenly suppose that a breach will cause
harm. . . when in fact the breach causes no harm at all," the contract
sum is not enforceable. "Evidence to prove such a mistake" the Com-
ment continues, "is admissible. '48 Courts therefore could have used the
factual-mistake doctrine to admit evidence of a lack of actual damage.
Despite the addition of this Comment, however, many courts inter-
preted the test of the first Restatement to prohibit admission of evidence of
actual damage or of the lack thereof.49 This result was apparently not
134 N.E.2d 329 (1956); Prentice, LiquidatedDamages in Illinois, 31 ILL. L. REv. 879, 885 (1936)
("validity of the stipulation must be judged as of the time when the contract was entered
into"). Contra Sweet, Liquidated Damages i Caliornia, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 84, 131-32 (1972)
(courts should emphasize "time of trial").
47 Illustration 3 to § 339, for example, gives a common fact pattern involving a contract,
containing a per diem damage clause for delay, to construct a grandstand. The Illustration
concludes: "Evidence that B could not have used the grandstand for spectators during the
period of delay is not sufficient to show that the delay caused no injury or that the harm is
capable of accurate estimation." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339, Illustration 3 (1932).
It is difficult to imagine a clearer case of no damages. This particular fact pattern arises most
often in bridge-construction contracts, where the bridge is not finished on time and per diem
damages are assessed although the road to the bridge is also not completed on time. For
examples of this fact pattern, see Massman Constr. Co. v. City Council of Greenville, 147
F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1945); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. City of Chicago, 234 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Ill.
1964), afd, 350 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1965). Illustration 7 states:
A offers to manufacture and deliver to the B Government specified guns at
$5000 each if delivered by May 1, or at $4000 each if delivered 100 days later.
B accepts the first offer at the higher price; but it is mutually agreed that in
case of delay beyond May 1 the price to be paid shall be reduced by $10 for
each day's delay. If the guns are not delivered until 30 days after May 1, B is
bound to pay no more than $4700, since that sum is the agreed price. Evi-
dence offered by A that the war is over and that the delay has caused no harm
is wholly immaterial.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339, Illustration 7 (1932). This Illustration presents the
essential facts of United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907). See notes 20-26
and accompanying text supra. The Bethlehem Steel Court also did not look to evidence of
actual damage.
48 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339, Comment e (1932).
49 McCarthy v. Tally, 46 Cal. 2d 577, 297 P.2d 981 (1956) is a classic case relying solely
upon the reasonableness of the sum as of the time of contracting. The court, relying on
Bethlehem Steel and the first Restatement, invoked the strict rule that no evidence of actual
damage could be admitted, because the intent of the parties cannot depend on events subse-
quent to the contract. Id at 986. For a discussion of this case, see Note, Contracts: Liquidated
Damages: Necessity of Actual Damages, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 126 (1956). See alro United States v.
Glens Falls Indem. Co., 152 F. Supp. 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. J.D. Streett &
Co., 151 F. Supp. 469 (E.D. Mo. 1957); McCarthy v. Tally, 46 Cal. 2d 557, 297 P.2d 981
(1956); Byron Jackson Co. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Cal. 1940); United States v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 35 F. Supp. 959 (E.D. Pa. 1940); Nester v. Western Union
Tel., 25 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1938).
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intended by Professor Corbin who, although not favoring frequent use
of a no actual damages defense, later wrote that "it is not necessary or
desirable to say that [liquidated damage clauses] . . . are enforceable
even though the plaintiff has in fact suffered no harm whatever, or to lay
down an absolute rule that the defendant can never introduce any evi-
dence as to the total absence or definitely limited extent of injury
suffered." 50
As in the pre-Restatement era, some courts took judicial notice of the
lack of actual damage and decided each case on the individual equities.
Norwalk Door Closer Co. v. Eagle Lock & Screw Co., 51 typifies this minority
view. In Norwalk, the court refused to enforce a liquidated damage
clause to which the parties had reasonably agreed, on the grounds that
there was no actual damage.52 The court held that the clause must be
reasonable, not only at the time of contracting, but also at the time of
enforcement. 53 The Norwalk case and other decisions like it contravened
decisions of courts following the first Restatement command to give effect
to the intent of the parties as viewed from the time of contracting.54
50 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1062 (1964). Each Restatement is the work of several
authors. Comment e is a holdover from Reporter Williston's original, tentative draft, which
explicitly advocated looking at the damages at the time of breach to determine if the parties
had contracted for a penalty or a valid liquidated damage clause. RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS (ALI Confidential Preliminary Draft No. 36) (Apr. 15, 1929) (available at Cornell
Law School Library). Examination of the tentative drafts of the first Restatement reveals that
Reporters Williston and Corbin did not intend to preclude admission of the lack of actual
damage to show that the stipulated sum was disproportionate to the actual harm. Id. (Notes
by George Jarvis Thompson) available at the Cornell Law School Library). The text omitted
mention of actual damage because, as Corbin explained it, "I wanted to make it more certain
. . . that the courts would not use my rule in such a way as to let one of the parties by trying
to prove there was not any injury at all substantially nullify and prevent all benefit from a
liquidated damage provision." 10 ALI PROCEEDINGS 181 (1932). Courts, however, focused
on the Restatement's Illustrations to exclude all evidence of lack of actual damages.
51 153 Conn. 681, 220 A.2d 263 (1966).
52 Id at 688, 220 A.2d at 267.
53 In an attempt to ground the decision in established case law, the court cited Restate-
ment § 339, Comment e and Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 412 (1947), for the
proposition that equitable principles prevented recovery when no damage had occurred. 153
Conn. at 688, 220 A.2d at 268.
54 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 778 (1961). For example, Massman Constr. Co. v.
City Council of Greenville, 147 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1945), and Bethlehem Steel Co. v. City of
Chicago, 350 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1965), are two cases very similar on their facts that reached
contrary results. Both cases concerned construction contracts containing a liquidated dam-
ages clause of per diem damages for delay. In Massman, although the contractor delayed
completion for 961 days, the bridge was actually finished 30 days before it could be used,
because the road leading to the bridge was not yet complete. The court allowed the contrac-
tor to defend on the ground of lack of actual damage, reasoning that the clause was intended
to guard against losses resulting from delays in completion. The clause was premised on the
assumption that delays would result in damage; when the assumption failed, the clause was
void.
In City of Chicago, the steel work for a section of highway was delayed 52 days, although
the state opened the highway route on schedule. As in Massman, the stated purpose of the
liquidated damages clause was to guard against delays in completing and opening of the
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The Restatement of Contracts, therefore, failed to resolve the conflict
between judicial adherents to the freedom of contract approach and
those courts that adopted an equitable perspective.
III
u.C.C. § 2-718(1)
Section 2-718(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code was the first leg-
islative attempt to inject more flexibility into judicial interpretation of
liquidated damage clauses. It reads:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agree-
ment but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the
anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of
proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise ob-
taining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liqui-
dated damages is void as a penalty.55
The UCC departs from the common-law treatment of liquidated dam-
ages in several ways. First, the "intention of the parties" test 56 is aban-
doned entirely. Second, the UCC text establishes that evidence of
actual damages or the lack thereof may be relevant in determining the
validity of the liquidated-damage clause.57
Courts and commentators have interpreted the phrase "anticipated
or actual harm" in two ways. The first interpretation reads section 2-
718(1) to require evaluation of the liquidated damage clause in light of
anticipated and actual loss. 56 Under this test, the defendant must prove
the absence of damage.
This interpretation of the UCC unites the two methods of analysis
that courts have historically used: not only must the parties attempt at
the time of contracting to provide a reasonable estimate of probable
harm, but the sum specified also must be reasonable in light of actual
harm. Theoretically, a liquidated damage clause may be an unreasona-
ble forecast of possible damage yet, due to unforeseen circumstances,
may become a valid approximation of actual damage.59 The first inter-
highway. The City of Chicago court, upholding the right of parties to contract freely, enforced
the clause, finding the measure of actual loss irrelevant. Because the clause was a reasonable
forecast as of the time it was entered into, it was valid and enforceable.
55 U.C.C. § 2-718(1).
56 See notes 40-45 supra.
57 But see Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495, 505 n.31
(1962) (UCC supports strict rule of McCarthy v. Tally, 46 Cal. 2d 577, 297 P.2d 981 (1956),
excluding all evidence of actual damages from consideration).
58 See Norwalk Door Closer Co. v. Eagle Lock & Screw Co., 153 Conn. 681, 220 A.2d
263 (1966); notes 60-62 and accompanying text supra.
59 The problem of compensating the plaintiff for damages unforeseen by both parties at




pretation of the UCC precludes recovery of liquidated damage in this
situation, because the sum is disproportionate to anticipated damage.
Problems with this interpretation are numerous. First, it eviscerates
the purpose of liquidated damage clauses, which is to allow parties to
avoid expensive and difficult litigation over contract damages. With
this interpretation, every case involving liquidated damages would re-
quire an inquiry into the actual damage. 60 Second, this interpretation
renders the second sentence of 2-718(1) superfluous. If the first sentence
of section 2-718(1) voids all damage clauses that are not reasonable at
the time of trial, then the second sentence, which states that "unreason-
ably large liquidated damages [are] void as a penalty,"6 1 adds nothing.
The second interpretation follows the language of the UCC more
faithfully. Under this interpretation, "anticipated or actual harm" in
the first sentence of section 2-718(1) allows the courts to enforce a liqui-
dated damage clause that either reasonably estimates the likely harm or
accurately reflects the actual harm.62 The second sentence will operate
to invalidate those clauses that reasonably estimated likely harm, but
turn out to be unreasonably large when compared to actual damage. 63
This second interpretation, however, would allow enforcement of a
clause unreasonable at the time of contracting, but reasonable in light of
actual damage.64
The UCC sets forth two additional factors to consider in determin-
ing the enforcement of a liquidated-damage clause: "the difficulties of
proof of loss, and the inconvenience or non-feasibility of otherwise ob-
taining an adequate remedy."' 65 The second factor appears merely to
restate the first; it adds nothing and courts have not decided cases based
upon the phrase. The requirement that a liquidated damage clause be
reasonable in light of "difficulties of proof of loss" is ambiguous because
60 See Note, A New Standard for Liquidated Damage Provisions Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 38 OHIo ST. L.J. 437, 454-55 (1977).
61 U.C.C. § 2-718(1).
62 See A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1063 (Kaufman Supp. 1980); W. HAWKLAND, A
TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE U.C.C. 170-72 (1964); Note, Liquidated Damages and Penalties
Under the Uniform Commercial Code and the Common Law- An Economic Analysis of Contract Damages,
72 Nw. U.L. REv. 1055, 1074-75 (1972).
63 Comment 1 suggests that if the clause is disproportionately small, unconscionability
provides the remedy. This approach is the one taken by the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts, although very few courts have embraced this position.
64 The second interpretation does not adequately address the problems raised by Hadley
v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341 (1854), of the foreseeability of damages. When Prof. Farnsworth,
Reporter for the Restatement Second, was asked about the situation in which a clause that is
unreasonable in terms of anticipated harm becomes enforceable because of the actual harm,
he pointed out that the UCC had not adequately resolved this problem, and concluded that
"I confess that I don't know a lot of hard authority on that." 56 A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 366
(1979); see Note, supra note 60, at 437 (1977) (discussion of the time of reasonableness problem
under the UCC).
65 U.C.C. § 2-718(1).
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it does not specify a time when these difficulties must arise. 66
Very few cases have discussed the UCC provision on liquidated
damages.67 Perhaps because of the terse language of 2-718(1), most
courts have not mentioned the section entirely, relying on common-law
principles dating from the first Restatement. 68 When they mention it at
all, the courts view the UCC test as requiring a general "reasonableness"
approach to all facets of the case.69
The UCC treatment of liquidated damages has also done little to
resolve the question of the role of actual damages resulting from the
breach. The courts remain divided over the role of actual harm when
evaluating a liquidated damages clause. A few retain the strict first Re-
statement rule and allow no evidence of actual damage.70 Most appear
confused over the role of actual damage in the reasonableness
66 Id; see Comment, Liquidated Damages: A Comparison of the Common Law and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1349, 1358-59 (1977).
67 The only case to date that has dealt with § 2-718(1) in depth, Equitable Lumber
Corp. v. I.P.A. Land Dev. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 516, 344 N.E.2d 391, 381 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1976),
apparently chose the second interpretation. Equitable Lumber concerned a liquidated damages
clause for an award of attorney fees. The clause provided that if the buyer breached the
contract, he would pay a "reasonable" attorney fee, set at 30% of the total money recovered.
The lower court awarded plaintiff nearly $4,000, but declined to enforce the 30% figure,
because a maximum of 10 hours of attorney time was needed to collect the judgment. It
therefore awarded fees of $450, or about 11%. The appellate court modified the award to
$750.
The Court of Appeals of New York reasoned that U.C.C. § 2-718(1) required the court
to determine whether the liquidated damages clause was reasonable in light of either the
anticipated harm or the actual damage. The court then reasoned that even if the clause met
the first test of reasonableness, the second sentence of U.C.C. § 2-718(1) required a determina-
tion of whether the liquidated damages were "unreasonably large" with respect "to the dam-
ages which plaintiff was likely to suffer from the breach in the event it did rely on [the
liquidated damages] agreement." The court, therefore, did not have to enter into a discussion
of the actual/anticipated harm test no "difficulties of proof of loss" arose. Attorney fees are
readily determinable damages, and the clause could have been void on this point alone. The
Equitable Lumber interpretation is not without controversy. See A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 1063 (Kaufman Supp. 1980).
68 For example, the court in Grumman Flexible Corp. v. City of Long Beach, 505 F.
Supp. 623 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) relied on Cotheal v. Talmage, 9 N.Y. 551 (1854), for the notion
that when the contract is signed, anticipated damages must be incapable of accurate estima-
tion. The Grumman court also relied on Brecher v. Laikin, 430 F. Supp. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
for the proposition that the amount must not be disproportionate to the damage reasonably
anticipated. Brecher had relied on cases dating from before 1925 whose common-law princi-
ples have been substantially modified by the UCC and the Restatement Second For other cases
decided on authority other than the UCC, see Mann & Parker Lumber Co. v. Wel-Dri, 579
F.2d 973 (6th Cir. 1978); Walker v. First Pa. Bank, N.A., 518 F. Supp. 347 (E.D. Pa. 1981);
Gorman Publishing Co. v. Stillman, 516 F. Supp. 98 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
69 See, e.g., Northwestern Motor Car, Inc. v. Pope, 51 Wis. 2d 292, 295, 187 N.W.2d 200,
202 (1971) ("[T/he statute contemplates that a liquidated damage clause may be enforceable
if 'reasonable' [,which] is a question to be determined after trial.").
70 See, e.g., Brecher v. Laiken, 430 F. Supp. 103, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (damage at the
time of contracting must be incapable of estimation); Carolinas Cotton Growers Ass'n v.






THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
A. The Test
Section 356 of the Restatement Second reads:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agree-
ment but only at an amount that is reasonable in light of the antici-
pated or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof
of loss. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unen-
forceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty.
72
The Restatement Second, but for a few insignificant semantic differences,
closely parallels the language of the UCC. 73 The Comments and Illus-
trations accompanying section 356, however, should eliminate many of
the interpretive problems that have plagued UCC section 2-718(1).74
The Restatement Second test is two-fold: the liquidated damages
amount must be reasonable both "in light of the anticipated or actual
loss" and in light of the "difficulties of proof of loss." The Restatement
Second definitively interprets the first stage of the UCC reasonableness
test as an either-or proposition: the amount of damage fixed by the
clause must be either a reasonable forecast of possible damage, or the
amount must be reasonable in relation to the actual harm.
75
The second prong of the Restatement Second test requires that the
amount specified as liquidated damages in the contract be reasonable in
light of the "difficulties of proof of loss. ' ' 76 A time orientation for this
test is absent in the language of the section. The difficulty of proof
could be measured at either the time of contracting, the time of breach,
71 See notes 57-64 supra.
72 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1979).
73 U.C.C. § 2-718 includes the phrase "inconvenience or non-feasibility of otherwise ob-
taining a remedy." Because no cases have been decided on this language, the drafters of the
Restatement Second omitted it. 56 ALI PROCEEDINcS 365 (1979); see note 65 and accompany-
ing text supra.
74 See notes 55-71 and accompanying text supra.
75 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1), Comment b (1979):
Under the test stated in Subsection (1), two factors combine in determining
whether an amount of money fixed as damages is so unreasonably large as to
be a penalty. The first factor is the anticipated or actual loss caused by the
breach. The amount fixed is reasonable to the extent that it approximates the
actual loss that has resulted from the particular breach, even though it may
not approximate the loss that might have been anticipated under other possi-
ble breaches. See Illustration 2. Furthermore, the amount fixed is reasonable
to the extent that it approximates the loss anticipated at the time of the mak-
ing of the contract, even though it may not approximate the actual loss. See
Illustration 3. ...
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(I) (1979).
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or the time of trial.77 The Illustrations, however, signal a change from
the old rule of considering the "difficulty of proof of loss" from the per-
spective of the making of the contract. The Restatement Second, unlike the
UCC, clearly indicates that the time of trial is the new vantage-point for
assessing proof of loss. 78
These two parts of the Restatement Second test are meant to be consid-
ered together. The Comment suggests a balancing approach: if the dif-
ficulty of proof of loss is great, the greater may be the discrepancy
between the contracted sum and the actual damage. 79 Although the
Illustrations are meant to demonstrate how the different parts of the test
work, their language makes it clear that both prongs must be satisfied to
validate a clause.
The Illustrations of the last sentence of section 356 also expressly
allow a defense of no actual damages if the liquidated damage sum at
the time of trial is "unreasonably" large.8 0 This position conflicts with
that of the first Restatement, which expressly denied a defense of no actual
damages.8' For example, Illustration 4,82 and the first Restatement's Illus-
tration 7,83 reach contrary results. Under Illustration 4, A contracts
with B to build a grandstand for Bs race track by a certain day, and
agrees to pay B $1,000 per day for each day's delay. If B cannot obtain
77 For a striking example of the differences between evaluating the proof problem as of
the time of breach or the time of contracting, compare the majority and minority opinions in
Truck Rent-a-Center, Inc. v. Puritan Farms Inc., 51 A.D.2d 786, 380 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1976).
78 Illustrations 3 and 4 of the Restatement Second § 356(1) are both based on a contract to
build a grandstand. In Illustration 3, "the actual loss to B is difficult to prove," and so the
clause is upheld. In Illustration 4, "it is certain" that A has suffered no loss at all. The only
difference between Illustrations 3 and 4 is an event occurring after the breach and before the
trial. This event, B's delay in obtaining permission to run the track, invalidates the clause
because actual loss "is not difficult to prove." The only time in the sequence of facts when the
result of no actual damage could be ascertained is the time of trial. This marks a departure
from previous case law, see notes 46-48 and accompanying text supra, when the vantage point
had been either the time contracting, or the time of breach.
79 The second factor is the difficulty of proof of loss. The greater the difficulty
either of proving that loss has occurred or of establishing its amount with the
requisite certainty (see § 351), the easier it is to show that the amount fixed is
reasonable. To the extent that there is uncertainty as to the harm, the esti-
mate of the court or jury may not accord with the principle of compensation
any more than does the advance estimate of the parties. A determination
whether the amount fixed is a penalty turns on a combination of these two
factors. If the difficulty of proof of loss is great, considerable latitude is al-
lowed in the approximation of anticipated or actual harm. If, on the other
hand, the difficulty of proof of loss is slight, less latitude is allowed in that
approximation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1), Comment b (1979).
80 Id.: "If, to take an extreme case, it is clear that no loss at all has occurred, a provision
fixing a substantial sum as damages is unenforceable. See Illustration 4."
81 RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRPACrS § 339(1), Illustration 7 (1932); see notes 48, 58-59 and
accompanying text supra.
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1), Illustration 4 (1979).
83 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339(1), Illustration 3 (1932).
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permission to open his track for a month, A's ten-day delay will cause B
no damages at all.
On these facts, the first Restatement concluded that "evidence that B
could not have used the grandstand for spectators during the period of
delay is not sufficient to show that the delay caused no injury or that the
harm is incapable of accurate estimation. '84 Illustration 4 of the Restate-
ment Second, however, concludes that "since the actual loss to B is not
difficult to prove, A's promise is a term providing for a penalty and is
unenforceable on grounds of public policy."85
The Restatement Second's actual-damage test requires a more careful
examination of the facts of each individual case than did the first Restate-
ment. The defendant may raise no actual damages as a defense and at-
tempt to void a clause which, at the time the contract was signed, was a
reasonable estimate of possible damage. Even though the parties may
have fully intended to be bound by the clause at the time of contracting,
the Restatement Second will provide relief from the bargain if no actual
damage occurs.
B. Ana.1sis and Recommendations
The Restatement Second adopted the language of the UCC, a statu-
tory law, and appended a case-law background. Because few cases have
been decided under the UCC liquidated damage provision, 86 the draft-
ers of the Restatement Second faced a difficult theoretical problem:87 Al-
though the purpose of Restatements is to distill established principles
from existing court decisions,8 8 such decisions were absent. Signifi-
cantly, none of the cases cited in the Reporter's Note and Comments
explaining the Restatement Second test mention the UCC. The drafters
organized this material, however, to give the appearance that their in-
terpretation of the UCC is solidly grounded in the common law.89 In
84 Id
85 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356, Illustration 4 (1979).
86 See notes 67-69 and accompanying text supria
87 One of the problems that has been more acute here than in some of the other
chapters is the problem of what to do with respect to the Uniform Commer-
cial Code provisions in the area in question. It seemed inappropriate to give
any substantial number of Illustrations to rules that are stated in the Code,
lest we seem to be attempting to put a gloss on and interpret the Code, which
is not our function.
56 ALI PROCEEDINGS 303 (1979) (remarks of Professor Farnwsorth).
88 The Introduction to the first Restatement revealed the original purpose of a restate-
ment: "The function of the courts is to decide the controversies brought before them. The
function of the Institute is to state clearly and precisely in the light of the decisions the princi-
ples and rules of the common law." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, Introduction, at xi
(1932).
89 For example, the Reporter's Note explains that Illustration 3 is based on United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907), the venerable Supreme Court decision
that enforced a liquidated damages clause when no damage resulted, on the ground that the
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effect, section 356 is a vehicle to promote a particular interpretation of
the UCO liquidated damage provision. 90 The section, because it is cast
in the form of a restatement of the law of the courts, will carry more
weight than ordinary commentary.91
The Restatement Second test, while vastly improving the law in cer-
tain instances, also poses problems. By adopting the second interpreta-
tion of UCC section 2-718(1),92 the Restatement Second perpetuates one of
the major problems with that interpretation. The approach validates a
clause specifying a damage amount that would be unreasonable if
viewed prospectively from the time of contracting, but that is reasonable
at time of trial because of damage occurring after the breach. This ap-
proach will allow a party to recover damages that were not contem-
plated at the time the contract was signed. 93 Arguably, this approach is
valid if limited to situations in which the damage was foreseeable at the
time of contracting, but simply not contemplated by the parties. The
subsequent harm from the breach must still meet the traditional con-
tract test of foreseeability, even if a liquidated damage clause fortui-
tously corresponds to the unforeseen harm.
In addition, courts should reject the implication of the Illustrations
clause was reasonable when entered into. See notes 20-26 and accompanying text supra. Al-
though both Illustration 3 and Bethlehem Steel would enforce the clause, their reasons differ.
In Bethlehem Steel, the lower court found, and the parties stipulated in the Supreme Court,
that actual damage was not present. 205 U.S. at 117. In the Restatement Illustration, however,
Bethlehem Steel becomes a "damages difficult to ascertain" example, and this fact upholds the
clause.
The Illustration 3 recharacterization of the Bethlehem Steel facts attempts to give the Re-
statement defense of no actual damage a foundation in common-law decisions. Historically, a
defense of no actual damage has never been explicitly acknowledged. Some courts took judi-
cial notice of the presence of damage and deemed the clause a penalty instead; others en-
forced the clauses. A more forthright method of handling the Bethlehem Steel case would have
been to distinguish it from the Restatement Second approach, or to reject it outright. The draft-
ers chose the latter tactic for a number of previous cases. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRAcTs § 356, Illustration 3, Reporter's Note (1979).
In reality, the facts of Bethlehem Steel resemble Illustration 4, which explains that events
occurring after the breach and before trial may serve as a basis for the defense of no actual
damages. Illustration 4 reads:
The facts being otherwise as stated in Illustration 3, B is delayed for a month
in obtaining permission to operate his race track so that it is certain that A's
delay of ten days caused him no loss at all. Since the actual loss to B is not
difficult to prove, A's promise is a term providing for a penalty and is unen-
forceable on grounds of public policy.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356, Illustration 4 (1979).
90 The Restatement Second's "either/or" test for anticipated and actual damage parallels
the second interpretation of the UCC § 2-718(1), discussed in notes 62-64 and accompanying
text supnra
91 Farnsworth, Ingredients in the Redaction of the Restatement (Second) of Contract, 81 COLUM.
L. REv. 1, 5-9 (1981).
92 See notes 62-64 and accompanying text supra.




that "difficulty of proof of loss" is measured at the time of trial.94 That
analysis is an overly restrictive limitation on parties' freedom of con-
tract. In virtually all cases covered by Article II of the UCC, the
formula of the contract price minus market price95 provides a means of
determining the actual damage. If applied at the time of trial, this
formula would allow courts to invalidate all liquidated damages clauses
on the ground that proof of loss is not difficult.96
Even when the damages may be capable of ascertainment at trial,
the parties should be able to fix their damage exposure in advance. 97 If
this amount turns out to be disproportionately larger than the actual
damage, the second sentence of Restatement Second section 356 will void
the clause as a penalty. Courts should de-emphasize the difficulty of
proof of loss test in favor of evaluating the reasonableness of the sum
contracted for in view of actual and anticipated damages. If at the time
of contracting the parties insert a liquidated damages clause in order to
control their damage exposure, no reason exists, barring fraud or coer-
cion, to thwart this desire.
Although the Reporter for the Restatement Second stated that he "ad-
hered to the principle that on the whole the trend is to validate [liqui-
dated-damages] clauses," 98 it is not immediately clear that section 356
will enhance parties' freedom to fix their damage exposure in advance.
The explicit test of actual damages encourages case-by-case analysis of
the equities of individual damage clauses. In at least one instance, this
will be a vast improvement over previous rules. Common-law courts
were reluctant to uphold liquidated damages clauses that specified one
amount for a variety of breaches. 99 Even in cases where the breach was
of sufficient magnitude to justify the use of the liquidated damages
clause, the clause was invalid as a penalty. Under the Restatement Second,
an overbroad triggering mechanism will not invalidate the clause if ac-
tual damages are proportional to the sum specified. 00 In this situation,
the intent of the parties will be upheld, and sloppy drafting will not
defeat the clause.
Under the Restatement Second, each court must ultimately decide
how much actual damage will suffice to uphold a clause. 10 The text
94 See notes 77-78 and accompanying text supra.
95 U.C.C. §§ 2-706, 2-708.
96 Comment, supra note 66, at 1359.
97 See Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v. Moore, 183 U.S. 642, 660 (1901) (if damages
are ascertainable at trial, court should require proof of damages actually sustained; "we think
the asserted doctrine is wrong in principle, was unknown to the common law, does not prevail
in the courts of England at the present time and is not sanctioned by decisions of this court.").
98 56 ALI PROCEEDINGS 366 (1979).
99 Courts continue to be reluctant to uphold these clauses. See Bradford v. New York
Times Co., 501 F.2d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 1974); C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 151 (1935).
100 Illustration 2 to § 356 of the Restatement Second specifies this result.
1Ol See, e.g., In re Gelino's Inc., 43 F.2d 832 (E.D. Ill. 1930) (liquidated damages 40%
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and commentary give no guidance in this matter. Presumably, courts
will not rely on any one formula, but will consider the essential fairness
of the clause in view of all the facts. Although courts should consider
the actual damage, they should also understand that parties contract for
liquidated damages to avoid costly litigation over damage that will be
uncertain or difficult to ascertain. The parties will rarely forecast the
exact amount of their damages. They contract for a liquidated damages
sum, however, with the knowledge that their estimate may not be com-
pletely fair to one party. Both parties knowingly accept this risk, and
consider it in the contract price.
The need for a flexible policy of allowing courts to invalidate a
clause that was reasonable when made, but is disproportionate to actual
losses, justifies an infringement on the parties' freedom to contract. The
first Restatement rule did not justify invalidating such clauses to avoid
injustice. The Restatement Second substantially reduces the need for judi-
cial maneuvering.
CONCLUSION
Under the first Restatement, judges had three choices when con-
fronted with a case of no actual damages at the time of trial: use the
Restatement to bar evidence of actual damages and reach an inequitable
result; label the clause a penalty, and by bending the rule, arrive at an
equitable solution; or openly criticize the Restatement position. 0 2 The
last two options yielded equitable holdings, but posed the danger of in-
consistent results. Some judges followed the Restatement strictly; others
did not. The Restatement Second solves this problem by giving an explicit
command to invalidate clauses that may have been reasonable estimates
of probable harm, but that ultimately prove disproportionate to actual
damages.
Susan V Feris
higher than actual damage held unenforceable). If the clause is seen as one limiting liability,
the disproportionality may have no limit. See Feary v. Aaron Burglar Alarm, Inc., 32 Cal.
App. 3d 553, 108 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1973); Ray Farmer's Union Elevator Co. v. Weyrauch, 238
N.W.2d 47, 50 (N.D. 1975).
102 See Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Section 1-103 of the U.CC., 72 Nw. U.L.
REV. 906, 907 (1978).
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